DISARMAMENT

A periodic review by the United Nations

Volume XIX, Number 2 1996

Address of the Secretary-General to the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters

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Address to the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, 1 July 1996

Boutros Boutros-Ghali

I welcome the opportunity to be with you again and to share with you my views on several disarmament and security-related questions. This distinguished Board plays a significant role as a source of novel, timely and practical ideas relevant to ongoing debates in the international arena.[1]

The founders of the United Nations had an inspiring vision of a peaceful world community whose members would not use armed force to accomplish political ends, who would seek to minimize the role of armaments and maximize the use of the earth's resources for economic and social advancement. That vision has guided United Nations disarmament activities and must continue to inform your discussions of the evolving and expanding disarmament agenda.

I would like to explore further with you the role of the United Nations in that agenda. Before I do, however, a word of caution. The Board is meeting only once this year because of financial constraints. The United Nations is experiencing the strains of reduction. It is facing a serious financial crisis. At the same time, it must execute to the best of its ability the many programmes decided on by Member States. If the ideas that we discuss here are to have an impact, they must be rooted in these realities.

The Advisory Board met from 1 to 5 July 1996 in Geneva.

For nearly a half century, the United Nations has made concrete progress towards the goal of a world not threatened by nuclear weapons. We are very near to agreement on another milestone in that direction: the adoption of the nuclear-test-ban treaty. Last Friday, the end of the second part of the Conference on Disarmament, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban put forward a new draft treaty. The outstanding issues, though crucial, are few. During this month, Governments should reflect carefully on these remaining issues. I shall continue to appeal to all Governments to exert maximum efforts and to demonstrate a great spirit of flexibility and compromise, so that the draft can be adopted at the opening of the third part of the session, at the end of this month.

For nearly a half century, the United Nations has made concrete progress towards the goal of a world not threatened by nuclear weapons. We are very near to agreement on another milestone in that direction: the adoption of the nuclear-test-ban treaty.

Let me reiterate here what I have underlined in messages to the negotiators in the Conference: nothing should deter the adoption of the treaty this year, in accordance with the wish expressed by the General Assembly at its 50th session. A nuclear-test ban will be a step towards nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. It will further devalue the role of nuclear weapons in international security. It will supplement accomplishments made at the bilateral level since the end of the cold war. Its rigorous verification provisions will expand the scope of international cooperation in the nuclear field.

Conclusion of the test ban will thus be a victory for nuclear and non-nuclear nations. It will honour the solemn commitment to achieve the ban this year that was made by the parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995. It will reinforce the non-proliferation regime in general and strengthen the commitment of the parties to the terms of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In particular, it will pave the way for a constructive beginning of the Treaty review process in 1997.

The test-ban treaty will also be a signal achievement of multilateral diplomacy and negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament. It will be the culmination of more than three decades of work. And it will be the second treaty of global importance, after the Chemical Weapons Convention, concluded by the Conference this decade.

The parties have selected the Secretary-General as depositary. The primary duty of this function is to serve as a legal guardian and monitor of adherence to the treaty. But the responsibilities are also political. I have pledged to use my good offices to work towards universal adherence to the treaty.

I stand ready to begin consultations on the best time to re-convene the 50th session of the General Assembly in order to receive the treaty and open it for signature. Resources permitting, I have also offered the cooperation of the United Nations in establishing the treaty organization in Vienna.

The test-ban treaty does not stand alone. Further disengagement and the downsizing of nuclear arsenals must be pursued. Reductions are under way under the terms of the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I). Solid commitments by the Russian Federation and the United States to implement fully the terms of START II are essential. I urge Russia to ratify that agreement. As long as nuclear weapons exist, States that have committed themselves to forgo the nuclear-weapon option are entitled to strong security assurances. A fissionable material production cut-off could also help to solidify the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Regional efforts have borne fruit during the past year. My own continent of Africa is now a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The nations of Southeast Asia have reached a similar agreement. The entire hemisphere of the South is now nuclear-weapon free. There is increased hope that these positive examples will encourage other regions to follow suit—I speak especially of the Middle East—in order to reach a nuclear-free world.

I would like to turn now from these issues of "macro-disarmament" to "micro-disarmament". The instruments of choice in most of today's conflicts are small arms and light weapons. Abundant and cheap, they are killing people by the thousands. "Kalashnikov" is a household word throughout the world. Mortars and portable anti-aircraft missiles are common. The anti-personnel land-mine, a durable and silent killer, is always present. Combatants, meanwhile, are not just regular troops but armed militias and gangs. Dramatic images of teenage soldiers brandishing their weapons are no longer shocking.

The instruments of choice in most of today's conflicts are small arms and light weapons....This is the new landscape of war.

This is the new landscape of war. The challenge is to find innovative and constructive responses. One positive example comes to us from the Government and people of Mali.

In 1993, the President of Mali informed me of the rash of illicit small arms in his country and asked the United Nations for assistance in collecting them. In 1994, an advisory mission identified certain sources of the influx of weapons and stressed the need for strengthened internal security mechanisms. A follow-up mission to other countries in the region in 1995 confirmed the need for a "security first" approach.

Parallel to these efforts, a peace agreement was reached under which the Tuareg rebels in the north of the country were to surrender their weapons. President Konare again called upon the United Nations, this time to assist in the collection and destruction of nearly 3,000 small arms. Just four months ago in Timbuktu, the pile of weapons was set aflame in a vivid and symbolic display that the conflict had come to an end. The United Nations was glad to participate in such a celebration, and remains actively engaged in helping Mali to implement the peace agreement.

The experience of the United Nations in Mali shows that the international community understands the need to turn greater attention to micro-disarmament.

The Disarmament Commission has adopted guidelines on arms transfers, an event that marks the first step at the multilateral level to exert control over the thorny issue of illicit arms trading. I congratulate Japan on its initiative in bringing about the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms and thank it for its support of this vital body.

In Central Africa, States have proposed a regional arms register to increase transparency in military matters. This confidence-building measure deserves the widest possible support.

And as you know, I actively support a total ban on all anti-personnel land-mines. A growing number of States have adopted unilateral bans on the transfer or use of mines. States should also increase their financial and technical assistance to countries in mine-clear-

The review mechanism of annual conferences [of the Parties to the Inhumane Weapons Convention] will sustain momentum towards further improvements in the protocol and a complete ban on mines.

ance activities and in improving mine-clearance technology.

In addition, I urge all parties to ratify the revised protocol on land-mines. The agreement on revised Protocol II has set a new precedent for international humanitarian and arms control law. For the first time, a provision bans transfers of all non-detectable anti-personnel land-mines. The provisions governing the protection of peace and humanitarian missions have been strengthened. And the review mechanism of annual conferences will sustain momentum towards further improvements in the protocol and a complete ban on mines.

On 28 and 29 June, I was at the "Group of Seven" summit meeting, where Italian Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini, in a press briefing, welcomed the intention of Japan and Canada to hold international conferences, as part of the effort towards a total ban on the production and use of anti-personnel land-mines.

The Board held a useful discussion in 1995 on the convening of a fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The Disarmament Commission concluded its debate on the question in May. There seems to be general agreement that a fourth special session should take place.

Elements of the *Programme of Action* adopted at the [first special] session —covering nuclear issues, chemical, biological, and conventional weapons— are being implemented daily.

The United Nations plays a special role in promoting and formulating international consensus on the pressing global issues of our times, as seen through the recently completed cycle of landmark conferences. I attach great importance to that function.

The historical value of the consensus reached in the Final Declaration of the first special session on disarmament, in 1978, is essential. Although the nuclear-arms race was still raging, the international community seized the opportunity created by a period of *détente* between the two major Powers to harmonize global opinion in favour of disarmament.

Elements of the Programme of Action adopted at the session, covering nuclear issues, chemical, biological, and conventional weapons, are being implemented daily. Nevertheless, differences persist with regard to the Declaration's continuing relevance in the post–cold war world. The second and third special sessions, in 1982 and 1988, were relative successes. But for a variety of reasons, which you have examined in your discussions, the divergences of views on key issues among Member States could not be overcome. The next special session must be constructive and positive in both in its review of the past and its guidance for the future.

The Final Declaration in 1978 was achieved in large part through extensive advance preparations. Five meetings of the Preparatory Committee were held. A similar process might be agreed upon for the special session now being contemplated. The actual timing of the session could remain under discussion while substantive preparations are under way. The tenor and progress of those discussions would then help determine the appropriate moment to convene the session in order to ensure a positive outcome.

Disarmament is a global enterprise, involving individual States, regional organizations and the international community as a whole. Only the United Nations offers the global forum, the global framework and the global mandate needed to deal with the threat of nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction. For the sake of human security in all its aspects, we must succeed in this essential endeavour.

Notes

1 Established by the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1978 (SSOD I), the Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters is composed of 22 eminent individuals in the field of disarmament and international security, who serve in their personal capacity. The Board advises the Secretary-General on issues of topical concern in the field of disarmament and serves as the Board of Trustees of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). The Director of UNIDIR sits on the Board *ex officio*.

The Proliferation of Light Weapons, Small Arms and Land-mines

Micro-disarmament in the Regional Context

Wolfgang Hoffmann and Wolfgang Richter

In his 1992 *An Agenda for Peace*,[1] the Secretary-General of the United Nations emphasized the need to explore the conditions and instruments necessary for successful peacemaking and peace-keeping operations. Inevitably, the role of small arms, including land-mines, in regional and internal conflicts would need to be forcefully addressed. Since that report, the Secretary-General has continued to attach importance to the issue of small arms in the context of international peace-keeping efforts. In his *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace* of January 1995, in which he used the term "micro-disarmament" for the first time, he stressed that "the

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Colonel (General Staff) Wolfgang Richter is a member of the delegation of Germany to the Conference on Disarmament.

This article is an adaptation of an address entitled "Priority Issues on the Current Disarmament Agenda: Global and Regional Concerns" delivered at the Eighth United Nations Regional Meeting on Peace and Disarmament in the Asia-Pacific Region, 21–24 February 1996, in Kathmandu, Nepal.

assembly, control and disposal of weapons has been a central feature of most of the comprehensive peace settlements in which the United Nations has played a peace-keeping role".[2] This aspect was again highlighted in the Secretary-General's 1995 "Report on the work of the Organization", where he discussed micro-disarmament in the immediate context of overall post-conflict peace-building activities.[3] The report made it quite clear, however, that, all current efforts notwithstanding, more had to be done and more resources had to be invested if there was to be any prospect of success in this area.

Discussion on this matter, however, has just begun. In attempting to contribute to it, I am well aware that I shall probably raise more questions than present solutions. I shall, at least, try to clarify what it is we are considering.

The dilemma of light weapons and small arms

During the cold war, global security was confronted by the imminent threat of global nuclear—and continental conventional—war, in which masses of conventional forces with the most modern equipment and capable of conducting far-ranging mobile operations would play the predominant role. Therefore, security politics was mainly concerned with maintaining international stability. Arms control efforts focused on balancing nuclear and major conventional weapons at reduced levels. Special attention was paid to conventional weapons that were inherently offensive, such as tanks, artillery, armoured infantry vehicles and fighter bombers.

The end of the cold war made substantial progress in global and continental arms reductions possible, resulting in an improvement of historic significance in international security. However, in some regions, that did not lead to an improvement in stability. A tendency to resort to violence has been increasing, driven mainly by the forces of ethnic conflict and irresponsible nationalism.

It is of particular concern that in most armed conflicts irregular forces are involved. In many cases such forces do not conduct military operations in the classical sense, i.e., the seizure of military objectives through rapid mobile movements and concentration of fire and troops; instead, they seek to destabilize a State and to trigger mass emigration of opposing ethnic groups by resorting to widespread terrorism against the civilian population. Most forces of this kind are hardly equipped with the types of sophisticated weapons that were subject to arms control efforts during the cold war. They use instead mainly light armament, often of a low technical standard. It is not nuclear weapons nor modern conventional technology, but rather light weapons, small arms and land-mines, which are—according to the Secretary-General's *Supplement*—"actually killing people in the hundreds of thousands". Often even the most basic of weapons—knives, spears and clubs—are used to do the maiming and killing.

Light weapons and small arms have not been subject so far to arms control arrangements either in the context of regional treaties, such as the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), or as a category in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. A steady stream of illicit arms continues to flow across international borders, maintained by a seemingly inexhaustible world market. Even in cases where a political solution to an internal or subregional conflict has been found, problems relating to the disarming of rival armed groups and the restoration of common security often remain unresolved. Such problems are the seeds of renewed confrontation in the future. For instance, if the central authority is weak and security cannot be guaranteed, former combatants will tend to retain their weapons. A situation like this might spill over into the civilian population, which will take security into their own hands by acquiring light arms.

If a peace accord is fragile or if the parties have failed to secure its long-term effectiveness by establishing regional and internal stability based on a military balance at drastically

reduced levels and other confidence- and security-building measures, rival factions will retain their weapons and prepare for resumption of hostilities in the future.

After years of war and violence, it is not an easy task to reintegrate soldiers into civilian life. Often from childhood they have learned nothing but to kill and destroy; they lack the skills necessary for civilian life. If, at the same time, the national economy is weak, they have no other prospect than unemployment and poverty.

Unfortunately also, after the cessation of hostilities, a country is often faced with the long-term remnants of the previous war. Thousands of land-mines may infest vast areas of the country and continue to kill and maim, to hamper reconstruction efforts and to paralyse supplies, communications and agriculture.

Measures to facilitate micro-disarmament efforts

This brief survey of the matter underscores the wide scope of micro-disarmament. Far more is involved than just adding another category of weapons to the United Nations Register, although in my view that might be a valuable measure to increase transparency in arms transfers. Micro-disarmament should be part of a comprehensive approach. It means removing war *matériel* in order to prevent hostilities from resuming. It also involves demobilizing and disarming warring factions, giving particular attention to light weapons and small arms. It would be greatly facilitated by the adoption of appropriate national and international measures, among which I suggest the following: (*a*) curbing the illicit arms trade, (*b*) securing internal and subregional stability and (*c*) disarming ex-combatants and reintegrating them into civilian life.

Without claiming completeness, I would like to share with you some thoughts on these aspects, which point to the deep complexity of the issue and cry out for more thorough study and consideration.

Curbing the illicit arms trade

Without an effective regime to curb the illicit arms trade, warring factions will always be able to obtain the weapons and ammunition they need to continue fighting. Among the effective national and international measures required, the following need to be considered:

—States could renounce the sale of arms to areas of tension and potential conflict. Here the emphasis is on supply-side restraint. Appropriate restrictions under national law, such as the very rigorous control regime of my own country, would seem to be a useful tool.[4]

—National self-restraint could be supplemented by international border controls when the situation requires.

—International assistance to national security forces and border guards of countries particularly concerned might be envisaged in order to strengthen their capabilities.

In the latter case, however, it should be stressed that the international community would not wish to support a country whose political system is not committed to human rights and to protecting its ethnic minorities, and which misuses its security forces to suppress its people. Furthermore, unconditional assistance to national security forces might result in another—this time legal—influx of light weapons, small arms and land-mines.

International cooperation on a regional basis would seem to be of particular value in dealing with the illicit arms trade and holds promise of positive results. In fact, it is a *conditio sine qua non* for "drying up" subregional conflict and internal violence. For that reason, I am extremely gratified that this question is being given special attention by the United Nations Disarmament Commission, which is now considering a set of guidelines focusing on illicit arms transfers.[5]

Securing internal and subregional stability

A peace accord that removes the underlying motives for resuming hostilities is a crucial precondition for an effective micro-disarmament process. There are several aspects:

—Peace must be based on the observance of human rights, protection of minorities and democratic participation of people, including, as far as possible, all formerly competing factions.

—A central authority that commands broad support with balanced participation of former adversaries should be created.

—The provisions of the peace accord should be guaranteed through international commitments, including peace-keeping operations made of composite forces under the auspices of the United Nations. Such forces could play a crucial role in keeping warring factions separated, restoring peace and security and helping to organize the disarming of rival forces and the creation of a unified security force. If the composite peace-keeping force is not regarded by all parties as able and willing to restore internal security and order and to ensure the implementation of the agreed peace provisions, any attempt to convince factions to turn in weapons will fail. It is, therefore, important that United Nations Security Council mandates are clear and feasible and, wherever necessary, robust enough to enhance the efforts by international forces in this field.

—Measures to cope with the internal security situation would be incomplete without an appropriate arms control regime that aims at subregional stability through the establishment of a balance of forces at reduced levels. Such a regime would help to prevent neighbouring Powers from establishing regional dominance. To secure its effectiveness it must include a strict verification regime. A subregional arms control regime has to be supported by international commitments.

Securing regional stability and establishing force balance through appropriate arms control agreements is a field

in which regional cooperation is absolutely essential to the internal stability of a nation emerging from conflict.

Disarming ex-combatants and reintegrating them into civilian life

Having dealt with the political preconditions for encouraging warring factions to surrender weapons, attention should also be paid to the motivation of the individual soldier to do so. Ex-combatants must be convinced that restoration of internal security will be achieved by the new central authority with international backing. That would include the capability of the authority to curb banditry, to enforce the disarmament of resistant groups if necessary, and to eliminate the dangerous remnants of war, with special emphasis on demining.

Why should a former combatant be willing to turn in weapons if he is not offered a realistic prospect of a future civilian life under humane conditions? In this respect, poverty and arms have always proved to be an explosive mixture. Giving former soldiers appropriate training to learn new skills in order to get a firm footing in civilian life is as important as disarming them of their light weapons. Such training, moreover, would be incomplete if it were not embedded in an overall effort to rebuild the infrastructure, restore the national economy, create or recreate a "social net" and fight unemployment. In most cases, no doubt, this attempt would be doomed to failure without international commitment in the framework of peace-building. Not only is regional cooperation required to solve the problem within the area that suffered under the war, but it is also in the self-interest of neighbouring States to prevent social unrest and violence from spilling over boundaries.

After an initial separation of the former adversaries, the establishment of training centres would appear to be useful. There, humane living conditions are crucial. "Gun buy-back" policies might also give further incentives to the warring factions to turn in weapons. Those centres would serve three purposes: *(a)* collection and controlled destruction

of weapons, (*b*) training ex-combatants in civilian skills and (*c*) establishing a combined and unified central security force under international auspices.

Safeguarding the turned-in weapons and securing transparency in arms reductions, preferably by destruction, are crucial as well. Otherwise, efforts would lose credibility, the peace process could rapidly deteriorate and the regional balance might be jeopardized by a new, uncontrolled flow of weapons into areas of actual or potential conflict.

I should also like to raise one other point. The measures that I have outlined might not resolve all the problems associated with micro-disarmament. I wouldn't want to paint an overly optimistic picture. There is always a risk of failure. Groups might remain belligerent and refuse to join the process. In that case consideration would have to be given to enforcing disarmament measures.

Conclusion

I should like to emphasize that micro-disarmament is more complex an issue than just posing the question of how to organize the collection of light weapons and small arms. Its success depends on the effective implementation and verification of a comprehensive approach of which it is a part. The goal of putting an end to the inhumane suffering of hundreds of thousands of innocent people should encourage the international community to study the problem further and, as soon as possible, formulate a sound conceptual approach and bring to bear the political will to implement it.

Notes

1 DPI/1247, see pp. 32–33.

2 A/50/60-S/1995/1 of 3 January 1995, pp.14–15.

3 A/50/1, p.126.

4 According to the "War-Type Weapons Control Act" dated 22 November 1990, any transfer of war-type weapons is placed under strict control by the German Government, which decides on a case-by-case basis. Transfers to allies are strictly bound to the purpose of self-defence in accordance with article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Transfers beyond NATO into areas of tension are prohibited.

5 The Commission adopted the set of guidelines in May 1996. See the report of the Disarmament Commission in *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-first Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/51/42)*, annex.

Land-mines: From Global Negotiations to National and Regional Initiatives

Cornelio Sommaruga

Maria is a three-year-old Mozambican child, found chained to a tree outside her hut. A case of parental cruelty? No, a case of a mother's protective love. Maria lives near a minefield and her mother must chain her to a tree when she goes off for the day to find water and firewood. Unfortunately, her mother stepped on a mine far from medical help and never returned.

The human face of a global tragedy—Maria, Amina and You Eng.

One fine day in 1992, Amina, a thirteen-year-old Somali child, went to the river to fetch water in the same place she had gone every day. But that day it had rained in the mountains, and the waters carried down with them mines that had been laid upstream. She stepped on a mine on the riverbank, which had been safe only the day before; her leg was shattered and had to be amputated by an ICRC surgeon. The mine which struck

Cornelio Sommaruga is President of the International Committee of the Red Cross. *This article is based on a statement delivered at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy on the occasion of the meeting of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, Geneva, 2 July 1996.*

Amina was laid fifteen years earlier, in 1977–1978, when Somalia and Ethiopia were at war and mined the mountains separating the two countries.

Sixty-five-year old You Eng, a Cambodian grandfather, tells this story: "I was asleep in front of the house when I was awakened by the sound of an explosion and my son's voice calling for help. My grandson was lying in the road, his left leg shattered by the mine blast. My son ran off to seek help. I was there looking at the child, who was writhing in pain, and I took him into my arms. When I started to get up I lost my balance a little and my right foot hit something. My right leg was amputated at mid-thigh. My grandson's left leg was cut off a little higher up. A few years ago my elder son and my daughter-in-law were killed by mines. Now I can no longer feed my family and this makes me ashamed."

The role of the ICRC

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), through its field operations in conflict zones on four continents, has been a direct witness to the land-mine carnage. The tragedies above are just a fraction of those we confront each month. And our experience is but faint reflection of the land-mine legacy which is claiming the lives and livelihoods of some 2,000 victims each and every month.

Our doctors and nurses every single day have to look into the eyes of children writhing in pain from a limb turned into a bloody tangle of blood, dirt, plastic bits, bone fragments and flesh. Eyes which ask us, "Why? Why? Why?"; to which we have no answer.

Land-mine injuries are among the most horrific known to our war surgeons. They require more units of blood, longer hospital stays, more surgical interventions and far more resources than most other injuries. They also require lifetime prosthetic care and rehabilitation—which is often not available. And those who reach medical care are the lucky ones;

just as many are estimated to die—often alone, like Maria's mother—at the site of their injury.

Given its mandate to care for and protect the victims of war, the ICRC would be negligent if it did not act. On the operational level we have made intensive efforts to develop effective surgical techniques for mine victims and to expand prosthetic and rehabilitative care. In 1995 alone, the ICRC's 33 prosthetics programmes fitted nearly 8,000 amputees and manufactured some 11,000 prosthesis. Over the past decade, we have treated over 30,000 mine victims and cooperated with local and national medical personnel to assist many times that number. We are currently running mine awareness programmes for civilian populations in Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia, Nicaragua and Somalia.

On the political level, the ICRC conducted extensive consultations in 1993 (including the Montreux Symposium) with military commanders, industry officials, diplomats, and legal and medical experts.[1] By early 1994 we were convinced that the only effective solution was the total prohibition of anti-personnel (AP) mines.

It is extremely rare for the ICRC to call for the total prohibition of a weapon. Before the end of hostilities in 1918, the Committee had referred in these terms to the scourge of poison gas: "We protest with all the force at our command against such warfare, which can only be called criminal." In 1921 the ICRC wrote to the League of Nations calling for the "absolute prohibition of the use of asphyxiating gas, a cruel and barbarous weapon which inflicts terrible suffering upon its victims." The call did not go unheeded. In 1925, during a League conference on the control of the international trade in weapons, Governments adopted the Geneva Protocol outlawing this form of warfare.[2]

We now again appeal to the international community to outlaw AP land-mines—a weapon which is indiscriminate and out of control. In our view, this weapon is too cheap, too

small and too difficult to use according to international humanitarian law to be controlled by means short of an absolute prohibition.

AP mines must not only be outlawed, their use must be stigmatized, so that whatever their understanding of the law, combatants will choose not to use them.

And finally, mine-infested regions must be cleared. Here I would like to pay tribute to the determination and courage of thousands of men and women around the world who put their own lives at risk each day in clearance operations. These operations deserve greatly expanded support, through both the United Nations Voluntary Fund for Mine Clearance and bilateral arrangements.

Review Conference of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)

Since 1994, the ICRC has had the privilege, in keeping with its mandate as guardian of international humanitarian law, to participate in the preparatory process and meetings of the Review Conference of the States Parties to the CCWC, which ended on 3 May.[3] The ICRC contributed official background documentation, analysis of weaknesses of existing Protocol II and proposals for strengthening it. We were grateful for the invitation of the Secretary-General and of States parties to be able to participate in this important process.

The ICRC warmly welcomes a number of important improvements in the amended Protocol, including in particular:

(a) Extension of the Protocol to apply in both international and non-international armed conflicts.

(b) Clear assignment of responsibility for mine clearance to those who lay the mines.

(c) A requirement that the location of all mines be mapped and recorded.

(d) New protection for ICRC and other humanitarian workers.

(e) A prohibition on the transfer of non-detectable AP land-mines.

(f) A requirement that States enact penal legislation to punish serious violations of the Protocol.

(g) Annual consultations among parties to the Protocol to review its operation.

Unfortunately, the new limitations on the use of AP mines are weak and could even lead to an increase in the overall use of those weapons. The existing general restriction against "directing" mines against civilians is, in our view, not enough—particularly as mines cannot be "directed" or aimed.

(a) Long-lived AP mines may continue to be produced, transferred and used—if placed in fenced, marked and guarded minefields. However, an exception was introduced which waives this requirement in cases of "enemy military action".

(b) Self-destructing mines may be used without any specific restrictions on their placement. Since such mines can be remotely delivered over long distances and in huge quantities by artillery or aircraft, their use could lead to an increase in civilian mine casualties.

(c) All AP mines used must be detectable so as to facilitate mine clearance.

However, it is appalling that parties are not required to implement these provisions on use until nine years after entry into force of the revised Protocol, which probably means by 2007 or 2008. By that time we expect that mines will have claimed more than 200,000 new victims—unless far more is done than required by the law.

The revised Protocol places no new restrictions on the use of anti-tank or vehicle mines which, although used on a smaller scale than AP mines, are just as indiscriminate. These mines may continue to be used even if they are not detectable;

neither their placement nor maximum lifetime are specifically controlled. These mines directly threaten operations of the ICRC and other humanitarian agencies whose personnel must daily risk their lives in bringing assistance to war victims. When they force us to send provisions by air, they increase our costs by up to 25 times.

Although the ICRC welcomes the improvements in the Protocol's general provisions it is deeply disappointed in:

(a) The weak restrictions on the use of AP mines and the lack of specific restrictions on anti-tank mines.

(b) The excessively long "transition period" for implementation of key provisions.

(c) The absence of a mechanism to verify the fulfilment of technical requirements for self-destructing mines and to investigate possible violations of the restrictions on use.

Given these weaknesses, largely due to the need to adopt the revised Protocol by consensus, the new Protocol, in and of itself, is unlikely to lead to a significant reduction in the level of civilian land-mine casualties.

The ICRC is concerned that the complex technical provisions for the use of various types of mines will not be implemented in the type of conflicts where most recent mine-use has occurred: internal conflicts involving poorly trained and equipped forces which may be unable or unwilling to abide by a complex set of rules or to pay an increased price for self-destructing mines.

The disappointing results of the Review Conference have reinforced the ICRC's view that only the stigmatization, prohibition and elimination of AP mines will put an end to the humanitarian scourge they have caused.

The ICRC will encourage States to adhere to the revised Protocol II in order to reinforce the minimum international legal norms which apply when mines are used. However, these norms

do not oblige States to use mines or to invest in new mine types. We will therefore encourage States to go far beyond their minimum legal obligations and to renounce the production, transfer and use of AP mines on the basis of:

(a) Their broader moral and humanitarian responsibilities.

(b) The indiscriminate nature of the weapon.

(c) The conclusions of a wide range of acting and former military commanders that the use of AP mines in accordance with law and doctrine is difficult, if not impossible, even for modern professional armies.

(d) A judgement that the limited military value of AP mines is far outweighed by their human, economic and social costs.

Towards elimination

The ICRC, together with the entire International Movement of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, will continue efforts to inform the public, military circles and decision-makers about the human tragedy caused by land-mines and to achieve the stigmatization of AP mines in the public conscience. The goal will be to ensure that, even before a legal ban is in place, combatants will choose not to use AP mines due to the abhorrence of their own societies of their effects and that producing countries will choose neither to produce or transfer these pernicious weapons.

We also suggest the following short-term agenda towards the goal of the elimination of AP mines, now endorsed in several resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly:

National and regional initiatives

The end of the land-mines crisis need not await a globally negotiated consensus. National Governments and regional or subregional organizations can decide to end the crisis in their own territories and thus contribute to a global

solution. The 25 States which have renounced the use of AP mines by their own forces and the 11 which are destroying their stockpiles have begun the process of freeing the world from the menace of these arms. Such actions should be seen as a means of protecting one's own population and territory should conflict occur.

When a critical mass of States have taken such steps, a de facto ban will have been achieved; a legal ban may follow as State practice regarding mines changes.

We welcome the resolution adopted in June by the Organization of American States (OAS) that called for the establishment of an "AP Mine Free Zone" in the Americas. A similar initiative of the Central American Parliament, in which national renunciation of AP mines is combined with increased assistance for mine-clearance and victim assistance, could make Central America the first mine-infested region to free itself from this scourge.

In February 1996 the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) called on subregional organizations on the continent to launch initiatives for the prohibition of AP mines in support of the OAU's previous commitment to a total ban.

Although this type of initiative has not yet reached the governmental level in Europe, the European Parliament, on 13 May, called on all Member States to unilaterally ban the production and use of AP mines and to destroy existing stocks. The Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, in April of this year, also supported the total prohibition of these weapons. The Interparliamentary Union, representing parliaments around the world, had already supported a ban in 1995, and more recently sent an appeal signed by some 250 of its members to the President of the CCW Review Conference. In December 1995, the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of the Islamic Conference appealed for the "complete elimination" of AP mines. We believe that the

political basis for far-reaching international action has been established and that the time is ripe for concrete actions on the national and regional levels.

International initiatives

We are also encouraged that Canada will host a international conference in Ottawa in autumn 1996 to bring together the more than forty States which support a global ban on AP mines to consider short- and medium-term steps they will take towards this end. As the first international meeting of pro-ban States, the meeting could significantly increase momentum towards a global ban and promote the types of national and regional measures mentioned above. We also believe it is essential to integrate, on a political level, efforts towards a ban with measures to stop transfers and to provide assistance in mine clearance. We also hope this will be the first of a regular programme of intergovernmental meetings in the coming years which will actively pursue the international community's goal of an AP mine-free world.

Negotiations for a legal ban

Although it is essential to continue building support for a future global legal ban on AP mines, it is our view that it would be premature to begin, already now, any new global negotiations before political and regional efforts have a chance to mature. Given that recent negotiations by consensus on new legal restraints produced only minimal results, the ICRC is concerned that new negotiations, particularly if conducted on the basis of consensus, would lead to disappointing results and could even divert attention from the dialogue needed nationally and regionally, as well as between political and military circles, on how progress can best be achieved.

Military utility

Progress in international humanitarian law results from an ongoing dialogue between military imperatives and humani-

tarian concerns. The ICRC sought to launch such a dialogue on the issue of AP mines through the publication, in March 1996, of a study on the actual use and effectiveness of these weapons in conflicts since the Second World War. One of the surprising findings was the lack of previous studies, even in military circles, of the use of AP mines, as used in actual combat. The ICRC will seek to broaden and deepen the dialogue with military organizations on this issue and would welcome collaboration with other appropriate bodies in this effort.

Increased assistance to mine victims

Currently only a small proportion, estimated at 15 per cent of mine victims, have access to rehabilitative programmes. Greatly expanded resources to provide both emergency medical treatment, blood transfusion services and lifetime prosthetics care to victims would be needed, even if mine use were stopped immediately. National and international agencies must be encouraged to increase support for these essential efforts through bilateral arrangements and through assistance to humanitarian agencies—including the ICRC and National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.

Enhanced mine clearance efforts

In 1995, the United Nations requested $75 million for mine-clearance funding but received only $20 million; this compared to an estimated $33 billion required to clear all currently emplaced mines. A massive and long-term international effort is needed if future generations are to be spared paying the price for today's land-mine legacy.

Mine-clearance, as witnessed in El Salvador, can also become a cooperative and reconciling endeavour among former parties to a conflict. Cooperative efforts among countries in mine-affected regions might also help provide substantial benefits to the regions concerned.

The broader context

The land-mine issue is but a part of a phenomenon of increasing concern to the ICRC: the virtually unrestricted flow of vast quantities of weapons, particularly small arms, throughout the world and their consistent use in flagrant violation of the norms of international humanitarian law. In recent decades, the ICRC has witnessed an appalling spread of small arms, like a cancer, into almost every corner of the world and to groups, including children, which would never before have had access to them. If this trend continues unabated, all of the efforts of the international community and of the ICRC to teach respect for humanitarian law will be insufficient. They will be literally overwhelmed by the flow of arms; it is far easier and far faster to distribute weapons than to disseminate humanitarian law principles to those who possess them.

For it is far easier and far faster to distribute weapons than to disseminate humanitarian law principles to those who possess them.

The ICRC is increasingly convinced that the transfer of arms is a humanitarian law issue. In the coming year we intend to launch a study, as requested by the XXVIth International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, on the relationship between arms availability and violations of humanitarian law and to initiate a process of dialogue on the issue within the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.

Conclusion

Whether the issue is mines, small arms or blinding laser weapons, the core issue is the same: whether humanity's moral and humanitarian instincts can control its worst instincts and growing destructive capacities. This will be one

of the greatest challenges of the coming millennium. In fact, it may even be the decisive challenge of the future.

The outpouring of public concern on the land-mines issue in recent years, as well as the dramatic response of many Governments, gives reason for hope. So also does the prohibition of blinding laser weapons, which represents only the second time in history that a weapon has been prohibited before its horrors were witnessed on the battlefield.

We also draw encouragement from the historic effort in which so many have been personally engaged: the achievement of global agreements outlawing biological and chemical weapons and ongoing efforts to put the nuclear genie back in the bottle.

These successes and the whole history of humanitarian law are proof that humanity is not impotent in the face of its worst instincts or the destructive uses of modern technology. Those involved in arms control negotiations and in positions of public responsibility concerning the use of mines and other weapons are not just "doing a job". They are handling matters of life and death for countless millions of voiceless people in every corner of the globe. They are at the cutting edge of humanity's struggle for survival.

Notes

1 Symposium on AP Land-mines, Montreux, Switzerland, 21–23 April 1993.

2 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV (1929), No 2138.

3 22 April–3 May 1996 in Geneva.

Workshop on Micro-disarmament: Defining a New Item on the Disarmament Agenda

Introduction

Sohrab Kheradi

In 1995, the Secretary-General coined the term "micro-disarmament" to describe "practical disarmament in the context of the conflicts the United Nations is actually dealing with"[1] —intra-State conflicts involving small arms and light weapons. This category of weapon, which had been relegated to the margins of the disarmament agenda during the cold war, is now presenting the international community with challenging tasks and rich opportunities for action. The Centre for Disarmament Affairs (CDA) organized a workshop, held at headquarters on 8 November 1995, to focus on this new approach: disarmament as an integral part of the process of preventing, mitigating and resolving conflicts and building peace once conflict is over.

This chapter is a selection of the material presented at the workshop. The participants, who were from within and outside CDA, shared their experiences dealing

Sohrab Kheradi, Deputy Director of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament Affairs, moderated the workshop.

with micro-disarmament on the conceptual and the operational levels.

A *tour d'horizon* of the many issues encompassed by micro-disarmament was given by the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Marrack Goulding: reasons for acquiring small arms, the continuum between security and development, and possible approaches to take.

Swadesh Rana of CDA described how the traditional paradigms of arms control did not meet the challenges posed by the excessive proliferation of small arms. Douglas Fraser of CDA outlined the disarmament and conflict resolution (DCR) project carried out by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), based on Virginia Gamba's introduction to the DCR case-study series *Managing Arms in Peace Processes*. (Mr. Fraser's presentation is not contained in this issue.) The project examined the utility and modalities of disarming warring parties as an element of conflict resolution.

Ivor Fung of CDA examined a specific instance of micro-disarmament: the high-level advisory mission sent by the Secretary-General at the request of the Government of Mali to study the problem of illicit proliferation of light weapons in that country and a follow-up mission to the Sahel-Sahara subregion.

Other crucial aspects of micro-disarmament, first the demobilization of combatants and their re-integration into civilian life, and secondly, the process of post-conflict disarmament, in particular possible means for disposing of surplus weapons, were taken up by Herbert Wulf and Edward Laurance, respectively.

Notes

[1] A/50/60–S/1995/1, pp. 14–15.

Expanding the Disarmament Agenda

Marrack Goulding

One of the most important objectives of disarmament has been to promote peace and stability among nations. The many efforts that have been made over the years to prevent the stockpiling, transfer, development or testing of different types of armaments that might have a destabilizing effect should be seen in the light of that goal. Another objective has traditionally been to minimize the capacity of various weapons to cause human suffering. Current efforts to put micro-disarmament on the disarmament agenda reflect both those priority objectives.

The uncontrolled flow of small arms into and through States can be a major destabilizing factor for the political and social situation of a country or a region. It affects all our lives in different ways. In countries everywhere, small arms proliferation evokes concern about the spread of crime and the increasingly lethal nature of criminal activity. In war-ravaged countries, a great deal of attention has been rightly focused on the human suffering caused by the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel land-mines, which take a terrible toll on human life and limb, and will continue to do so for decades to come. Micro-disarmament fits four-square into the kind of priorities and objectives that have always informed the disarmament agenda, and is therefore an important additional item on that agenda.

Marrack Goulding is Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs at the United Nations.

Micro-disarmament fits four-square into the kind of priorities and objectives that have always informed the disarmament agenda, and is therefore an important additional item on that agenda.

Micro-disarmament has become accentuated not only as a result of the end of the cold war, but also to some extent because of the cold war itself. One of the less attractive features of the cold war was the extent to which the major Powers allowed themselves to fight their battles by proxy in third world countries. Anyone who has ever visited southern Africa, Central America, Southeast Asia or West Asia has been struck by the enormous volume of arms that are sloshing around those parts of the world as a legacy of the cold war. Both sides, in a highly uncontrolled way, had been pouring weapons into those areas to those fighting their wars by proxy. A vivid demonstration of some of the consequences of such arms flows was seen in Nicaragua. When the United Nations was helping to disarm the Contras, considerable alarm was created in some capitals by the revelation that a large number of highly effective surface-to-air missiles had been delivered to that group. Yet there was no record of where they had been delivered or where they were at that time. In a part of the world beset by powerful and rich drug dealers, the thought that a large number of "red eyes" and other sophisticated surface-to-air missiles systems had gone missing was a matter of very grave concern.

The situation might not be as acutely obvious in other countries as it was in Nicaragua, but the serious repercussions of uncontrolled small arms proliferation remain the same. The consequences of the cold war in the Horn of Africa, for instance, are the enormous number of AK-47s—the Kalashnikov rifle—and other small weapons easily available there at low cost. These are the weapons that are killing people right

now. While weapons of mass destruction remain a major threat, they aren't actually killing people. Small arms are killing people in large numbers. The situation has been made worse by another consequence of the end of the cold war, the rekindling of a number of conflicts frozen during the course of the cold war—in Europe, in the non-European parts of the former Soviet Union and, to a terrible degree, in Africa. These conflicts are being fuelled by the excessive flow of small arms around the world.

Owing to the nature of current conflicts, as well as to the characteristics of small arms and light weapons themselves, it is proving more difficult in some ways to bring such weapons under control than it has been to control weapons of mass destruction or major conventional weapon systems. In many cases, small arms are being used in conflicts between factions without governmental structures and chains of command and people with whom to negotiate. In many cases, they are being used by criminal gangs. One problem is that there are no records for such weapons. Most Governments that manufacture major weapon systems know what they have manufactured and where the products go. This is not necessarily the case with small arms. It is difficult to get a handle on the quantities and types of small arms produced, and where they are transferred. Even if you could find people with whom to negotiate, the lack of reliable data about quantities, types and end-users makes it difficult to conclude the kinds of agreement that can be reached for larger conventional weapon systems.

So why is it that there are so many small arms and light weapons available, flowing around and being bought and sold? It's not simply a matter of oversupply. It's not merely a matter of surplus from the cold war. Why, in fact, do people feel that they need small arms at present? How are arms merchants finding customers? We already have some answers to those questions—internal conflicts, deliberate destabilization by one Power to achieve political results in a neighbour-

ing country, the crime scene. A major consumer, or source of demand, for small arms is clearly the international drug trade. If one recalls that the trade in narcotics handled by the major international crime syndicates probably turns over somewhere between $300 and $400 billion a year, is it any wonder that there is an enormous amount of money available to buy small arms, creating an attractive market for manufacturers and traders in those weapons?

But a further complication is that there are respectable reasons for the demand in small arms. One of the findings of the mission, which the Secretary-General sent in 1994 to Mali, at the request of the Government of Mali, was that a lot of the small arms held illegally in that country were held by people who felt the need to have a weapon in their houses because the law and order that a functioning Government should normally provide to its people was no longer being provided. As a result of financial, structural and administrative difficulties, the Government of Mali was no longer in a position to ensure law and order, a protection that should be a standard part of the services that a Government renders to its citizens. This same situation obtains for many countries other than Mali. Householders feel they have an obligation to have their own weapons to protect themselves, their families and their property. If need be, they will obtain them illegally.

There is no security without development; there is no development without security

That illustrates another point which is very close to the Secretary-General's heart—the continuum between security and development There is no security without development; there is no development without security. The international community thus faces the rather difficult task of persuading United Nations programmes, funds and offices concerned with economic and social development that they should be ready to make voluntary funds available to finance efforts to strengthen the

capacity of Governments to provide basic law and order. Only in that way can the kind of security be established in which people can concentrate their minds and energies on development.

There are other key questions that need to be squarely addressed when looking at the causes and effects of the flow of so many small arms around the world and when searching for an effective international response to the problem. For instance, how should the international community set about the difficult task of getting the flow of small arms under control, and then possibly reduced? In this regard also, the international community finds itself facing a set of questions similar to those facing the United Nations in the narcotics fields. To what extent can the excessive flows of small arms and light weapons be tackled at the production end? How much at the point of transfer? Or at the consumption end?

It is indeed of crucial importance that the international community is tackling the complex of questions and issues surrounding the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. It will not be easy. I am nevertheless absolutely sure that one way to advance the traditional disarmament objectives of promoting peace and stability among States and avoiding human suffering is to seek answers and solutions to these pressing questions.

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Light Weapons and Current Conflicts

Swadesh Rana

"Gone are the good old days when well-trained armies fought each other over hotly contested but clearly understood objectives." Today a statement of this sort would be labelled an exercise in politico-military nostalgia. Yet it may help to understand what distinguishes current day conflicts from earlier ones and to point out why traditional paradigms of arms control may not be adequate to deal with the phenomena which the Secretary-General has called micro-disarmament.

Most current conflicts are characterized more by mindless violence than any clearly stated objectives. They are not fought by regular armies. They do not have defined military targets. At times, the causes for which a conflict started are not the causes for which it was fought. A food riot started by youngsters in the streets of a poor country may turn into full scale civil strife aimed at overthrowing its Government. Refugees fleeing from starvation across a frontier might set off a chain of events resulting in toppling the regime in the receiving country, particularly if the country in which they are taking refuge has sizeable sections of populations whose ethnic and communal affinity is with the incoming refugees. We may never be able to anticipate every situation that can lead to civil strife.

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In Rwanda, Somalia and Burundi, the average age of the fighter is getting younger. There are more untrained people using weapons for causes which the rest of the world finds very difficult to understand. The peace process becomes even more difficult when we look to resolve the causes of conflict rather than the conflict itself. Is there some linkage between the easy availability of weapons to disaffected groups within society and their disinclination to rely upon peaceful change to achieve their objectives?

Using a Kalashnikov AK-47, a grenade, or a mortar, does not require any training. In fact, some of the weapons that have been used in conflicts like Somalia, Rwanda, and Burundi are not even seen as weapons until they are used as such. Consider the damage that can be done, for example, with a twisted pipe from a car to which a string of rubber and a stone have been attached. Or a Molotov cocktail. These weapons can be produced as a cottage industry, in backyards. They are sold cheaply on the international market: a rifle can be bought for six dollars, a chicken or a bag of maize. Some of them are simply stolen. The supplier is not known, nor the buyer. Only the user can be identified.

One of the most disturbing political aspects of present-day conflicts is that people who start the conflict pick up causes to fight for. They start by wanting to have food for their families and end up wanting a separate State in the name of self-determination. They rise up in the name of human rights for an individual, get involved with the subject of group rights for the minorities and end up by presenting their case to the international community as a case for ethnic or national self-determination. These conflicts are likely to be exacerbated because a larger variety of weapons is available from a wider variety of sources at cheaper prices to a larger number of people.

What kinds of situations might erupt into conflicts? Apart from such cases as Rwanda, Somalia, and Burundi, the

Global Humanitarian Emergencies reports prepared by the United States intelligence community and distributed as a public document recently anticipates that in the next two years at least 30 countries in the world are likely to face the type of conflicts I am referring to.[1] The report anticipates that a combination of man-made and natural causes may result in civil strife in those countries. If there are no organized armies and no State parties involved, negotiating a peace settlement to end these conflicts will not be easy. Anywhere up to three quarters of the population in those 30 countries are likely to be internally uprooted or forced to flee across frontiers. As an indirect consequence of the conflicts in those 30 countries, at least 80 other countries in the world are likely to be affected by such conflict-induced social phenomenon as receiving refugees, displacement of their own populations, and civil strife from within caused by groups, which might have ethnic or religious affinities with the refugees. These are optimistic situations to look forward to. I believe this explains the interest in the media, in the public and among policymakers on how to deal with current conflicts and what to do about light weapons as primary tools for these conflicts.

The main point I would like to make here is that traditional paradigms of arms control may not be adequate to deal with the phenomenon of small arms or light weapons. Unlike weapons of mass destruction, small arms cannot be eliminated as a category of weapons, because the very weapons causing so much death or destruction lately are also necessary for keeping internal security.

Traditional paradigms of arms control may not be adequate to deal with the phenomenon of small arms or light weapons.

The available international mechanisms to promote non-proliferation of weapons may also prove ineffective to stem the flow of small arms. One, because proliferation has

already occurred. Two, because identification of sources and causes of production might be impossible: small arms production might be a cottage industry. Monitoring mechanisms may also prove wanting when there is no direct connection between who supplies arms, who buys them and who actually uses them. The route might be circuitous. The weapons used in Afghanistan and supplied by the Soviet Union, the United States or China, show up in Viet Nam, are perhaps routed to Thailand and end up somewhere in Rwanda or Burundi.

The available international mechanisms to promote non-proliferation of weapons may also prove ineffective to stem the flow of small arms.

Arms agreements are negotiated with international entities. Most of the small arms and light weapons, however, are being used by individuals and groups who are not accountable to any State authority. Involving them in the negotiating process risks legitimizing the use of violence by giving recognition to groups which have resorted to violence and have not agreed to peaceful change.

The time is ripe for political action. The militarily powerful countries in the world, which had kept a strategic balance during the cold war, are not by and large overly anxious to get involved with the conflicts in which small arms are being used. There is also a certain war-weariness or fatigue among countries in the neighbourhood of conflicts being fought by light weapons. Much of it is perhaps caused by the hardships imposed on them by the refugees fleeing from the scenes of violence. Indeed, some of the heaviest burdens of receiving internally-displaced persons and refugees have fallen on some of the poorest countries in the world, like Malawi for example.

In sum, there is a disinclination by the major military Powers to get involved in areas of conflict, a certain war-weariness by the neighbours of the countries in conflict, and a growing sense of public outrage at random violence for purposes which are not always very clearly understood. These, in combination, I think provide the political background against which new initiatives in this area are being taken.

I am hopeful that something will be done. Micro-disarmament is not so much a new item on the disarmament agenda as a process of consolidating under one item what has been hitting us in the face for several years. There are specific situations like Mali, where the subregional Powers are now willing to insulate the Tuareg rebellion from outside sources of procurement. Another is that the international community and Member States have not waited for international action before taking some initiatives of their own.

Micro-disarmament is not so much a new item on the disarmament agenda as a process of consolidating under one item what has been hitting us in the face for several years.

When faced with new challenges, the United Nations as an Organization sometimes finds itself at the receiving end of requests which Member States should be carrying out themselves. In the area of micro-disarmament, however, Member States have not waited for a general enunciation of global principles to deal with small arms. In South Africa, for example, tougher laws have been initiated to make sure that small arms and light weapons are not stolen from the armouries of the police and the security forces. Germany has a very well-established law not to supply weapons to areas of tension. Some consideration is being given in the academic

community and among legislators to enact laws to require that every weapon produced carry a manufacture's mark, so that wherever a weapon ends up, it would be possible to trace it back to the owner.

Commonality of interest in breaking any linkage between illicit arms transfers, drugs and criminality is one area where concerted action is in the offing. One instance is that of subregional cooperation between authorities dealing with border controls and internal security forces.

Afghanistan, which belongs to an area that has the heaviest concentration of unaccounted light weapons, has introduced a resolution in the General Assembly for several years asking that the major suppliers of weapons to former areas of tension during the cold war be held accountable for retrieving those weapons.[2] Then there are subregional initiatives such as those resulting in the bonfire of light weapons in Mali.[3]

It seems to me that the most reassuring aspect of the current situation in respect of small arms and light weapons proliferation is that Member States have not waited for an international agreement on how to go about curbing it.

Notes

1 "*Global Humanitarian Emergencies*," United States Government Document, February 1996.

2 The most recent example is resolution 50/70 H.

3 On 27 March 1996, in Timbuktu, Mali, nearly 3,000 light weapons, including rifles, grenade launches, machine guns and pistols, were set aflame as a part of the peace agreement between the Tuareg and the Mali Government.

Control and Collection of Light Weapons in the Sahel-Sahara Subregion: A Mission Report

Ivor Richard Fung

The legislative mandate of the Advisory Mission on the Control and Collection of Light Weapons in the Sahel-Sahara Subregion is found in the relevant paragraphs of General Assembly resolutions 40/151 H, on the provision of advisory services in arms control matters, and 46/36 H, on the provision of advice by the Secretary-General concerning the trade in illicit arms.

Historical background

The President of Mali identified a problem with the proliferation of illicit small arms in his country, a problem that contributed in a major way to instability and violence there. He requested the Secretary-General to assist in defining the scope of the problem and identifying ways in which it could be alleviated. In essence, he wanted advice and assistance on how to collect and control those illicit small arms.

Ivor Richard Fung is a Political Affairs Officer with the United Nations Centre for Disarmament Affairs.

In response to that request, the Secretary-General conducted an in-house study that concluded that the problem was subregional, and that the most efficient and effective method was to approach it on that basis.

The President of Mali identified a problem with the proliferation of illicit small arms in his country, a problem which was a major contributor to instability and violence there.

In the event, coordination with the States of the subregion proved difficult in the near term, and it was decided to carry out a pilot project in Mali, with the full intention of extending the programme in the subregion if that seemed feasible and worthwhile. Hence, the first phase of the mission was conducted in August 1994 in Mali. The second phase took place in February and March 1995 in the following countries: Burkina Faso, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal. Let me add that Algeria, though participating in the discussions on the project in New York, was not in a position to receive the mission at that time.

Field work

The mission was led by Mr. Eteki Mboumoua, former Secretary-General of the OAU. It included staff from two offices of the United Nations Department of Political Affairs, the Centre for Disarmament Affairs and the Africa II Division, as well as the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa. It met with many sectors of the societies of the countries visited, with governmental and non-governmental organizations, with local United Nations agencies and with diplomatic representatives.

Central to the work of the mission was the preparation undertaken by the countries themselves. Some of the Governments provided in advance, as requested by the mission, a memorandum giving their assessment of the problem. Other relevant documents, for example, the "Pacte National" between the Government and the Tuareg people in the case of Mali, were provided as well.

Central to the work of the mission was the preparation undertaken by the countries themselves.

Each Government established a national commission on the proliferation of small arms to, *inter alia*, act as the focal point for interaction with the mission. Each also provided facilities for meetings, interpretation services and ground and air transport within the country. Discussions were held with relevant ministers, such as, defence, interior, foreign affairs, and other senior officials. There were also courtesy visits to the heads of State or prime ministers, as appropriate, in most of the countries. These high-level meetings revealed the great concern of the Governments involved about the issue of small weapons and the importance the leaders attached to the search for solutions to the problem.

Method of work

The mission examined the security situation in each country and the reasons for socio-economic unrest, the status of relevant legal documents, problems of refugees and internally displaced peoples, banditry and the phenomena of "auto-defence" or self-defence—all issues related to the proliferation of illicit small arms.

It tried to determine the scope of the problem through an examination of the situation concerning smuggling, thefts, illegal sales, misuse of traditional weapons and national legislation related to the foregoing.

It discussed the state of the security forces and the customs service in order to understand their roles and their capacity to carry out those roles.

It studied the current efforts being made by the Governments concerned to alleviate the situation, including measures undertaken in cooperation with neighbouring States, and the assistance being provided by donor States, the United Nations and its agencies, non-governmental organizations and others.

Findings and recommendations

The Mission concluded that:

—There was indeed a problem with illicit small arms, but it was very difficult to quantify it owing to a lack of accurate information. Typical users and types of incidents were identified. Origins and sources were difficult to identify, but external sources were a major factor. National legislation was generally adequate but needed to be updated and enforced.

—Apart from Mauritania, where authorities stated that they had no problem relating to small arms and that their control measures and means were adequate, there was, generally, a lack of human and material resources within the Governments involved to help control the security situation. Human resource requirements revolved around better training and the payment of adequate compensation for tasks performed. Material resources include such items as computers, communication equipment, electronic-screening facilities at key entry points, and all terrain vehicles.

—The lack of security was fuelling the demand for weapons. The availability of weapons was fuelling the cycle of banditry and violence, which, in turn, was bringing structural development to a virtual halt and preventing any progress on socio-economic problems.

—Until this latter situation was redressed, there was little or no opportunity for the collection of small arms in these countries. On the other hand, it was possible for the mission to make a number of recommendations concerning the control of small arms.

Those measures of control necessary to create a climate allowing collection translate into the need for a "security-first" approach. At first glance, this may seem to be in contradiction to an arms control exercise, but on closer examination a good case can be made for this method.

These measures of control, necessary to create a climate allowing collection, translate into the need for a "security-first" approach.

The concept of security-first relates to personal security, which, in turn, is essential to structural development. Provision of that personal security is a basic responsibility of Government. It follows that the Government must have the capacity to do that. Governments in the region are strapped for resources, have competing demands for those that do exist, and therefore need external assistance.

Security assistance is always a sensitive subject, no more so than in Africa at this time. It is important then to highlight two other conclusions of the mission:

—First, that security assistance in this context should not be confused with defence assistance. The assistance envisioned does not involve weaponry and the emphasis is on security forces other than the defence establishment, i.e., police, gendarmerie, national guard and customs.

—Second, that the assistance, from whatever source, needs oversight by a neutral authority.

Therefore, the mission made two sets of recommendations. The first comprised those actions that the Govern-

ments of the countries concerned might take on their own with minimal external assistance. The second comprises actions that might be taken or coordinated by the United Nations.

The recommendations to Governments include:

(a) Improved internal controls and procedures.

(b) Tightening of national legislation.

(c) Better training for security forces.

The recommendations for the United Nations include:

(a) Fostering a subregional approach.

(b) Arrangements for monitoring and supervision.

(c) Assistance in training, developing confidence-building measures, standardizing legislation and customs procedures.

Regarding action by the United Nations, it will be clear that work needs to be done to obtain the resources to implement any recommendations. In that light, the intention is to:

—First, coordinate closely with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), whose mandate to assist in human security and good governance might be the vehicle for the delivery of these recommendations. Coordination with UNDP headquarters in New York is already under way. For example, the Department of Political Affairs assisted the UNDP office in Bamako, Mali, in explaining to Mali's partners in development the necessity to fund security-related projects in the north of Mali where the armed rebellion took place.

—Second, interact with major donor States that are active, or wish to be active, in interested countries in the region, and solicit their support for this security-first approach. I should add that, following DPA's recent assistance to Mali which I have just mentioned, we have been solicited to carry out the same exercise in Niger, where an armed rebellion also took place.

The convening of a subregional workshop to confirm the conclusions and recommendations of the advisory mission is envisaged. That workshop could also offer the opportunity to explore the idea of a regional variant of the Register of Conventional Arms, a project linked in many ways to the core mandate for the mission.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this may seem a long way round to accomplish what seems, on the surface, to be a simple exercise in the collection and control of illicit small arms. I would like to mention two points in this context. When the mission met with President Konare at the end of their visit, he made the point that for a fraction of the money spent on the ongoing United Nations mission in Rwanda, security assistance now could prevent the spectre of such a calamity in his country. Hence, it cannot be gainsaid that "preventive" micro-disarmament is meaningful and relevant in the context of preventive diplomacy. Secondly, the experience of the United Nations in recent years has proven that new and innovative approaches are necessary. We believe this approach is worth the effort.

Disarming and Demobilizing Ex-Combatants: Implementing Micro-disarmament

Herbert Wulf

The reduction of the number of people employed by the armed forces and their reintegration into civilian life is important to the success of micro-disarmament. If this process is not well managed, demobilization might actually increase uncontrolled access to small arms. The diversity of demobilization experiences among countries is very great, so it is difficult to generalize. For example, the relatively well-funded and managed demobilization programmes of some NATO countries are quite different from the reduction of the newly-created armies of the former Soviet Union, or the demobilization undertaken under United Nations peace-keeping operations in countries after protracted civil wars.

Reduction of armed forces

The total number of armed forces, worldwide, has declined considerably over the past decade. (The rising trend of the early 1980s continued, from 28.2 million in 1985 to a high of 29 million in 1987.) With the current downward trend, the number dropped to 24.1 million in 1994; thus the armed forces have been reduced by about one-sixth of their original personnel strength. These figures include only regular (governmental) forces. The reduction of opposition forces has been even more rapid.

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(Note: only governmental forces)

Demobilization may be the result of one or more of the following factors:

1. A multilateral, bilateral or national peace accord or disarmament agreement.
2. Defeat of one of the fighting parties.
3. Perceived improvement in the security situation.
4. Shortage of adequate funding.
5. Perceived economic and development impact of cuts.
6. Changing military technologies.

Disarming the combatants

The following table of recent demobilizations in Africa and Central America illustrates that about one million soldiers and guerrilla forces have been demobilized during the 1990s in these regions, and more demobilizations are planned. In other countries in Asia and in other parts of Latin America, large numbers of ex-combatants have also been demobilized.

An essential prerequisite of successful post-conflict demobilization is careful disarmament of the ex-combatants.

Most demobilizations in developing countries took place after an armed conflict, and often the United Nations was involved in mediating the peace accords and organizing the demobilization and disarmament. Disarming these combatants, as a rule, requires micro-disarmament. Furthermore, many weapons are "floating" around in the country or may be hidden. Micro-disarmament is an important issue and deserves high priority on the disarmament agenda. Ex-combatants usually carry light weapons, the weapons that are—according to the Secretary-General's *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace*—actually killing people in the hundreds of thousands.[1]

Recent demobilizations in Africa and Central America

Chad	15,000	soldiers 1992–1994
Eritrea	48,000	ex-fighters 1991–1994. 12,000 more planned
Ethiopia	500,000	of the defeated Mengistu army 1991; 22,000 OLF,1992–1994
Mozambique	90,000	70,000 of the government and 20,000 of the Renamo forces 1992–1994
Namibia	43,000	including people fighting for South Africa 1989
Uganda	32,200	soldiers 1992–1994; 12,500 more planned
Angola	70,000	planned after unifying 160,000 FAA and UNITA forces
So. Africa	40,000	planned after formation of the new SANDF
Cuba	120,000	in early 1990s
El Salvador	38,000	government and FMLN 1992–1993
Haiti	7,000	all regular forces in 1994
Nicaragua	98,000	75,000 Sandinista soldiers and 23,000 Contras end of 1980s–1992

An essential prerequisite of successful post-conflict demobilization is careful disarmament of the ex-combatants. If they are not properly disarmed and armouries are not well protected, banditry may be fuelled or arms may end up in the wrong hands. Often, ex-combatants have learned little else than using lethal force to solve problems as they perceive them. Disarming them is complicated since they may own more than one weapon. Although they may turn in one weapon, another may be hidden elsewhere. It has happened

that former guerrillas picked up these weapons when reintegration failed or when political problems emerged again. Political conflicts and the inability of the Government to fulfil commitments made to the demobilized ex-combatants have caused the flare-up of conflict or led to rebellions.

In his 1992 *An Agenda for Peace*,[2] the Secretary-General emphasized not only peace-keeping—an issue high on the international agenda today—but also spoke about "the critically related concept of post-conflict peace-building". He emphasized that preventive diplomacy sought to resolve disputes before conflict breaks out, while post-conflict peace-building could prevent the recurrence of violence. This is exactly where demobilization and disarming of ex-combatants has its place. The outbreak of new wars, the emergence of new conflicts and rearmament can be prevented by converting military to civil structures and by disarming combatants. Demobilization entails more than merely shifting people from military to civilian employment. The ex-combatants themselves are going through a personal process of adjustment, often losing a clear and predictable environment. They need counselling and economic support.

Transparency and precision with regard to arms collection, safe storage or on-the-spot destruction have proven to be crucial. The risk exists that arms may "disappear" and be transferred into areas of conflict. Stocks of weapons that have become surplus as a result of the end of conflict require special attention and initiatives to scrap or (in rare cases) convert them.

The typical demobilization process

The figure below shows in a simplified way the phases that post-conflict demobilization and disarmament usually go through. These phases are in reality often overlapping.

The Process of Demobilizing, Disarming and Reintegrating Ex-Combatants



Lessons learned

The experience of the past has shown what can go wrong when armed forces are demobilized and if they are not properly disarmed. At the same time experience has proved that demobilization and disarmament of ex-combatants is essential to stability and to the sustainability of peace. Managing post-conflict demobilization successfully depends on a number of conditions:

At the same time experience has proved that demobilization and disarmament of ex-combatants is essential to stability and to the sustainability of peace.

— Demobilization and disarmament require a cessation of hostilities. Demobilization and disarmament have little chance if one of the fighting parties is not fully supportive.

— Demobilization and disarmament are facilitated by regional security and stability.

— Demobilization rests on a credible central authority.

— Early planning is important. Armies might start to disintegrate before formal demobilization is organized.

— Demobilization is fostered by bringing all the combatants into a unified national force prior to demobilization.

— Central assembly points are useful for disarming ex-combatants.

— If the living conditions in the encampments prior to demobilization are poor, desertion of soldiers (with their weapons) might occur.

— If the encampment takes too long and the demobilized are left without information about their pros-

pects, violent activities and rebellion could undermine the demobilization and disarmament process.

— Failure to demobilize and disarm might endanger peace-keeping operations.

— Transparency with regard to arms collected is vital. Weapons should preferably be guarded by an external military presence.

— Disarmament must go beyond disarming individual soldiers and units to include national or regional disarmament.

— Appropriate ways of dealing with "surplus weapons" should be applied to avoid their transfer into areas of conflict.

— Financial support is essential.

— Reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life helps to avoid a return to picking up the arms again.

— The post-conflict demobilization itself is a complex and sensitive logistical exercise and usually conducted in a rather short period of time. The reintegration phase is a long-term process.

Support for demobilization and disarmament of ex-combatants is a positive measure that helps to reduce the number of people under arms and to avoid the negative effects of excessive military spending. It is thus a useful contribution to disarmament and peace as well as to human development.

Notes

1 A/50/60–S/1995/1 of 3 January 1995.

2 DPI/1247, pp. 11–12.



Surplus Weapons and the Micro-disarmament Process

Edward J. Laurance

The military confrontation between East and West ensured a steady increase of weapon stocks worldwide for decades. At the beginning of the 1990s, these stocks included massive amounts of major conventional weapons: military aircraft, tanks, artillery systems, warships and submarines, and an almost unfathomable number of light weapons and small arms. Since 1989 bilateral and multilateral disarmament agreements, as well as unilateral national decisions to reduce armed forces and weapons expenditure, have resulted in large quantities of surplus weapons being generated within a short period of time. Additionally, many regional conflicts have been resolved and partial disarmament successes achieved.

The responsible disposition of this surplus is now one of the most urgent tasks for ensuring a peaceful future. Surplus weapons, those no longer considered by States to be essential to their armed forces, can create a whole series of international and internal security risks, as well as technical, economic and ecological obstacles to peaceful development.

The responsible disposition of this surplus is now one of the most urgent tasks for ensuring a peaceful future.

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This is especially true where there is a lack of governmental security structures and the weakening of the State's monopoly on the use of force.

—Ex-combatants and soldiers can and do simply retain some of the weapons despite official peace treaties. The "arms build-up" in such societies generally leads to an increase in the willingness to use force in domestic conflicts (sometimes attributed to ethnic or religious factors) accompanied by the formation of gangs and a high crime rate.

—These surplus weapons are also offered for illegal sale, both nationally and internationally on the world market by private and governmental traders. This creates an inexhaustible source of reserves for regional conflicts, such as in Bosnia or other places. Consequently, a central task in producing a stable peace is to disarm parties previously at war and to collect existing surplus arsenals.

It is these two conditions that prompted the Secretary-General's call for action—micro-disarmament.

The surplus in light weapons

Much of the attention given to surplus weapons relates to the disposition of large stocks of major conventional weapons such as tanks and aircraft. While some of this surplus is being absorbed in Europe, and some of it is being destroyed, a significant percentage of this surplus is being exported. But the concept of micro-disarmament does not apply to this situation. Rather, it is the surplus of light weapons or small arms which prompted the Secretary-General's concern. How is this category of weapon defined? One definition for these weapons are those which can be carried by an infantry soldier or perhaps a small vehicle or pack animal. Another definition focuses on those weapons which do not need elaborate logistical and maintenance capability, and can be employed by insurgent groups and paramilitary formations. Whatever definition is used, an analysis of the weapons actually being

used in conflicts around the world provide an empirical answer—hand guns, carbines, assault rifles, submachine guns, machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, light anti-tank missiles, small calibre mortars, shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles and hand-placed mines.

In his January 1995 *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace*, the Secretary-General addressed four basic reasons for the accumulation of these types of weapons:

—Earlier supply during the cold war.

—Internal conflicts.

—Competition for commercial markets.

—Criminal activity and the collapse of governmental law and order, giving an excuse for citizens to arm themselves.

In the developing world, such accumulations have taken place where postwar rebuilding is in progress, such as in El Salvador, Haiti, Nicaragua and Panama. In other parts of the world, such as Angola, Mali, Mozambique, South Africa and the Horn of Africa, there remains a surplus of light military equipment and small weapons that was created upon the settlement of various domestic conflicts.

The situation in El Salvador

In El Salvador, disarming the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) insurgents and reducing the army were stipulated by the peace treaty of 1992 which ended the twelve-year civil war. Comprehensive demobilization occurred under United Nations supervision, beginning with partial disarmament. More than 11,000 guerrillas surrendered approximately 10,000 handguns, rifles and automatic weapons such as M-16s and AK-47s, 74 missiles and over 9,000 grenades. These weapons were destroyed and a similar amount of weapons collected from those soldiers of the El Salvadoran army who were demobilized.

But several years after the civil war ended, it is now known that despite the successful peace process, not all of the weapons supplied to the FMLN and the Salvadoran army during the civil war were collected. The Salvadoran Defense Ministry, as well as the United Nations mission (MINUSAL), estimate that 200,000–300,000 military-style weapons remain in civilian hands and pose a serious threat to peace. Social and economic conditions also play a major role in producing the climate of violence present in El Salvador today. Close to 40,000 combatants were demobilized with the arrival of peace, the large majority of whom have been unable to adapt themselves to the new climate of peace and reconstruction. The unemployment rate oscillates around 50 per cent.

Military weapons and poverty are proving to be a deadly combination. Thousands have taken up arms and formed criminal gangs responsible for the violence threatening to overwhelm the country. Disgruntled youths have formed United States-styled criminal gangs called *maras*, well-trained in the handling of military-style weapons, such as M-16s, AK-47s, M-3 hand grenades and RPG-2 rocket launchers. Their criminal activities include road blocks, bank robberies, bus robberies, street theft, kidnappings, extortions and street violence. These activities, when promulgated with military-style weapons, also result in injuries and death to innocent civilians. The authorities are extremely challenged, particularly the National Civilian Police (PNC), which expects to increase its ranks by 6,500 new recruits by July of 1996, doubling its present number. In addition, communities have began forming neighbourhood watch groups to cooperate with the authorities in the fight against crime.

Senseless acts of violence have become commonplace. Hand grenades are a particularly critical problem, given that they are so available. They are commonly carried by many citizens in their pockets and on their belts, and increasingly are used to settle personal arguments, with devastating effect on

the targets as well as innocent bystanders. Car theft using hand grenades is an everyday occurrence. Children are hurt or killed when playing with hand grenades. M-16 and AK-47 assault rifles are the weapon of choice for robberies and robbing buses, making public transportation less and less safe for citizens. Bus routes have been either shortened or eliminated.

Monsignor Fernando Sáenz Lacalle, Archbishop of San Salvador, the Government of El Salvador, through the Defence Ministry, human rights activists and community leaders all concur that violence is the country's most pressing problem. In a recent poll of Salvadorans, over 80% of the civilian population considered crime and violence the most serious threat to peace and national security. The violence committed with these military weapons is apolitical and affects all sectors of the population of the country.

Gun buy-back programmes as a practical method of micro-disarmament

What are the options for El Salvador in coping with these weapons so clearly responsible for crime and violence? The Government has taken many responsible steps in this direction. In the aftermath of the civil war, new laws outlawed possession of military weapons and required all citizens to register handguns and personal weapons. A new police force was created, trained under United Nations supervision to ensure a force committed to helping all people of El Salvador. This new police force, the PNC referred to above, also received specialized training in searching for, confiscating and destroying the military-style weapons that have threatened national stability and the peace process itself. A special commission of parliamentarians was established to deal explicitly with the surplus weapons problem.

Despite these steps, the problem remains. It was in this environment that the El Salvadoran Government requested assistance from the United Nations. In the final report

to the Security Council on ONUSAL, S/1995/220 dated 24 March 1995, the Secretary-General specifically noted in paragraph 12 that a new approach, gun buy-back programmes, might be considered for El Salvador. Buy-back programmes are those which seek to have citizens voluntarily turn in weapons based on amnesty—no questions asked, and a set of monetary or in-kind incentives.

> "During this last mandate, ONUSAL's remaining military observers have closely monitored the adoption and implementation of legislative and administrative measures taken to collect military weapons in the hands of civilians or State institutions. While a limited number of registered arms are still to be collected, the main problem lies with the unknown but large number of weapons of which there are no record. The Government has reported the seizing of approximately 2,000 such weapons since the beginning of 1995, but voluntary surrender has thus far been negligible. This is a matter for concern which should be addressed promptly. *Buyback programs such as those used in Nicaragua and Haiti might be considered.*" [Emphasis added].

On 27 March 1995, researchers with the United Nations Centre for Disarmament Affairs (UNCDA) briefed ONUSAL and El Salvadoran governmental officials on the basic principles and experience of buy-back programmes as practiced in many American cities. Our study of these United States programmes, and the buy-back programmes conducted by the United States Army in Haiti, revealed certain key aspects.

—First, they must be conducted in conjunction with other social development programmes which address the basic causes of crime such as poverty and unemployment.

—Second, they must be conducted in parallel with other efforts such as improving the capability of police, seizure programmes and building community involvement.

—Third, buy-back programmes have objectives in addition to the lessening of crime by reducing the weapons supply. To the extent that they decrease the availability of automatic weapons and items such as hand grenades, they reduce the lethality and collateral damage of crimes.

Additional objectives include promoting community solidarity, enhancing the legitimacy of local and national leadership, and focusing attention on the link between weapons availability and crime. Accomplishing these latter goals builds norms against crime, especially with military weapons, which in turn can enhance the actual turn-in of weapons later on.

Additional objectives of buy-back programmes include promoting community solidarity, enhancing the legitimacy of local and national leadership, and focusing attention on the link between weapons availability and crime.

The proposed gun buy-back programme in El Salvador

A tentative plan has been developed by UNCDA for a buy-back programme in El Salvador. It is based on initial meetings with ONUSAL and El Salvadoran governmental officials. The United Nations agencies to be involved have met (UNDP, UN/DPA and UNCDA), the El Salvador Mission to the United Nations has been briefed, and the draft plan forwarded to the Government of El Salvador. After receiving the briefing on gun buy-back programmes in March and the

draft plan in August, the Government of El Salvador is considering this plan. The Government could make a formal request to commence formal planning for this programme under Assembly resolution 40/151 H, which concerns the provision of advisory services in the field of disarmament to member States if they so request.

Initially focusing on a buy-back of hand grenades in El Salvador might enhance the likelihood of success for several reasons. First, these weapons are purely military, left over from the war and not easily manufactured by criminals. Second, although there is a large number of them, the number is finite. Third, a programme based on bringing in hand grenades would not threaten law-abiding citizens who have guns for protection in light of the increasing crime problem. And finally, unlike handguns, decreasing the use of grenades, especially in an urban environment, has the humanitarian goal of lowering the number of innocent civilians wounded by these grenades.

In many countries experiencing problems with weapons and crime, the situation is not ripe for the buy-back approach. Even in El Salvador a buy-back programme will not solve the crime and violence problem. But previous experience shows that such programmes can contribute in a vital way to energizing the community to cooperate in eradicating this problem. The fact that such programmes are voluntary makes them particularly relevant for the United Nations. The United Nations effort in implementing the peace accords has put into place developing security structures that allow such an approach to proceed, assuming it is well-planned, funded and adapted for the situation in El Salvador. Furthermore, there is a consensus in El Salvador that it is time to take a first step in this direction.

El Salvador as the typical micro-disarmament case

The development of a plan to implement a buy-back programme. in El Salvador illustrates certain general criteria which should govern the involvement of the United Nations in micro-disarmament actions in general.

—It is clear to all parties that the surplus of weapons in the society is a major factor in the armed violence.

—The weapons causing these problems are military-style weapons not needed by law-abiding citizens for their personal security.

—The internal security forces of the country concerned are unable to collect these weapons or otherwise disarm those using these weapons to destabilize the country on their own.

—The internal security forces of the country are developed enough so that the United Nations can provide that marginal assistance which will allow these forces to conduct a disarmament campaign.

—The community and social structure of the country have the potential to organize so as to play a major role in working with internal security forces to combat the weapons and violence problem.

—The initiative for United Nations involvement in micro-disarmament actions lies with the Member States, who are best suited to ascertain that the above criteria exist.

The number of countries in need of micro-disarmament continues to grow, especially in light of the attention brought to the problem by the Secretary-General. A buy-back programme in El Salvador may provide a prototype that can be applied to other situations, and put some teeth into the concept of micro-disarmament.

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Regional Arms Control

Controlling Conventional Weapons in Latin America: A Treaty Proposal

Thomas S. Mowle and Guillermo Balmaseda

In the 1990s, multilateral talks began among major weapons exporters to try to control the supply of conventional weapons to the Middle East. Some also called attention to the supply of arms to East Asia. These approaches are as likely to fail as a counter-narcotics policy that relies on controlling supply instead of demand. Because there are a variety of potential sources of weaponry to a region—including production within the region itself—it is very difficult to successfully manage a supply-side approach. We suggest that limiting demand is a better way to achieve a stable balance of weaponry.

Conventional forces in Latin America Treaty (CFLA)

This article proposes that Latin America be used as a model for conventional arms control, a model that could be

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exported to other regions. Latin America is an area ripe for experimenting with arms control precisely because levels of hostility are relatively low and militaries are relatively small and balanced. Latin America, where conflicts are less salient than elsewhere in the developing world, can act as a laboratory for an arms regime. Much as the Treaty of Tlatelolco is a model for nuclear-weapon-free zones, a conventional forces in Latin America treaty (CFLA) would be a model for other regions.

That region has historically demonstrated its vulnerability to the "contagion" of arms purchases: if one State acquired new weapons, its rivals quickly followed suit.[1] Although it is generally viewed as a peaceful region, almost every country in Latin America has a border dispute.[2]

Regulating conventional forces in Latin America

One could control arms balances through regulation of arms sales, expenditures, or inventory. This section discusses each in turn.

Regulation of sales

Many States inside and outside a region can upset the arms balance by supplying or transferring weapons. This variety of sources makes the supply-side approach to arms control questionable. Since the 1970s, Latin American arms purchases from France, Germany, Italy, Israel, the former Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom have each exceeded those from the United States.[3] Furthermore, Latin America does not import all its weapons from outside the region. Argentina and Brazil have had significant arms industries of their own, producing for their own use and for export. It seems difficult to suppose that all these States would agree to limit the provision of arms to Latin America. The incentive to cheat

is obvious: restricting supply will increase prices if demand is constant, increasing the profitability of arms sales.

Out of region sources

During the 1980s, United States policy on arms transfers to Latin America focused on strengthening El Salvador and Honduras in their battles against insurgencies and on strengthening Venezuela's ability to guard its sea lanes in order to protect oil shipments. Sales to these three countries accounted for half of the United States total sales of $2.1 billion between 1985 and 1989. The United States only accounted for 12.2 per cent of all arms shipments to the region in this period, and current figures show a steady decline in sales since then. The United States entry in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms shows that its only transfers for 1992 were 10 combat aircraft to Chile and 4 to Ecuador.[4]

In the case of El Salvador and Honduras, the United States did not upset the balance since it sold weapons to both parties of a dispute and—more important—because the weapons were for counter-insurgency operations and not major offensive weapon systems. Arms sales to Venezuela (most notably the F-16s), however, have exacerbated the imbalance it has *vis-à-vis* Colombia, somewhat mitigated by the large United States presence in Colombia involved in counter-narcotics operations.

In February 1994, the United States concluded an agreement to sell 36 A-4M Skyhawks to Argentina. This deal, and one to sell A-7 Corsairs to Chile, is the first sale of combat aircraft to Latin America in over a decade, and will replace Argentina's ageing A-4Ps (converted A-4Bs) and Chile's equally old Hawker Hunters.[5] This sale should not affect the arms balance between Chile and Argentina. Chile countered by purchasing 25 Mirage M-5Ms from Belgium; this did not hinder the territorial arbitration.

Although it accounted for 57.6 per cent of arms transferred to Latin America during 1985–1989, Russia/the

former Soviet Union no longer plays a dominant role. Arms transfers to Cuba and Nicaragua accounted for 98 per cent of its total. It seems unlikely, however, that more arms from the Russian Federation will officially enter the region due to economic problems with the suppliers and recipients alike. In addition, only Cuba, Nicaragua, and Peru used Soviet weapons and it is unlikely that other countries will opt to establish new training, logistical, and maintenance support structures for these weapons.[6] It must be noted, however, that in Russia and other former Soviet countries in need of hard currency, weapons are for sale on the black market to anyone with the required cash.

Other sources accounted for 19.7 per cent of arms transferred to the region in the 1985–1989 period. Of these, France had the highest share, at 4.9 per cent, owing to the popularity of their aircraft and tanks. Nevertheless, growing discontent with French aircraft due to the high cost of maintenance and general logistical support problems may signal that France will be playing a smaller role in the Latin American arms market. The next largest supplier is Israel, with sales throughout Latin America, most notably aircraft and naval vessels. West Germany's 4 per cent market share made it an important supplier as well. Although it sells to almost all the countries in the region, Argentina and Brazil were the major buyers during 1985–1989, with 84 per cent of its total. The United Kingdom and other European countries together account for 4.8 per cent of arms transfers to Latin America, including armoured personnel carriers, naval vessels, artillery systems, defensive missiles, and small arms. North Korean transfers to Cuba, Nicaragua and Peru accounted for 0.6 per cent of transfers to the region. South Korea, China, Australia, and South Africa combined are insignificant suppliers, accounting for only 0.6 per cent during 1985–1989.

Regional sources

Until recently, Brazil was one of the largest arms producers in the world. Most of its production was devoted to exports. Brazil exported heavily to Iraq during its war with the Islamic Republic of Iran and to other countries in Africa and the Middle East in the 1980s. It was also successful in selling the EMB-312 Tucano to the United Kingdom for its new trainer.[7] Within Latin America, Brazil has sold armoured fighting vehicles to Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela; and aircraft to Chile, Honduras and Venezuela. The United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) estimates for Brazilian arms exports in 1988 was a respectable $700 million.

Their military industry appears to be slowing down, however. According to the editor of *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers*, Brazilian military exports dropped to $100 million in 1989 and further to $70 million in 1991. This is a 90 per cent drop in only three years, along with a drop in imports from $340 million to $20 million over the same period. Combining these figures with Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) methodology for estimating military procurement as a proportion of the overall budget, it appears that total Brazilian military production in 1991 was only $169 million.

Argentina had a large defence industry in the 1980s. It produced artillery, armour, aircraft and submarines; the Condor missile programme was of grave concern in the United States.[8] In the last few years, however, the defence industry has been privatized and largely shut down, according to the DIA. The Condor programme has been dismantled, the Pampas aircraft is out of production, tank plants have been closed, and shipyards are up for sale.

Thus it is evident from this section that arms enter Latin America from a variety of sources; Argentina and Brazil are capable, if necessary, of producing high-quality conventional weapons. Any one of several countries could increase

its market share in Latin American arms sales if other countries agreed to restrict their own sales. These findings are not unique to Latin America. Obviously, out-of-region suppliers can sell to any part of the globe, but domestic arms industries can provide weapons for other regions as well. For that reason, the proposed treaty in the next section will suggest that an agreement to limit demand would be easier to enforce and maintain than a suppliers' treaty.

Regulation of expenditures

The second mechanism for regional arms control is regulation of military expenditures. This has a certain simple appeal. Pastor is one of the few to advance a general proposal of this kind.[9] He discusses the obvious benefits to economic and social development of cuts in military spending. His proposal is simply to incorporate Robert McNamara's suggestion that all States cut defence procurement and expenditures by 50 per cent by the year 2000. The Organization of American States (OAS) would monitor sales, purchases, and expenditures, with violations yielding unspecified penalties. Such limits on expenditures do not get at the core of the problem, despite their simplicity. If a State cuts expenditures by 50 per cent, but keeps the most advanced offensive forces, this can destabilize the balance by placing a higher value on pre-emptive attack. On the other hand, if Brazil produces weapons for sale to the Middle East or Southern Africa, Latin America is not directly affected.[10] Furthermore, verification of arms expenditures will be very difficult without intrusive auditing of national budgets. This emphasis would be as fruitless as the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks were in Europe in the 1980s.[11]

Regulation of inventory

The true goal of arms controllers is to balance the number and type of weapons possessed by all sides. Expenditures, sales, purchases—all these are peripheral to the

actual military balance. A better framework would, like the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) regulate inventory. The CFE also includes some of the best features of Pastor's proposal: a multilateral treaty, inspections of weapons levels, and adjudication by an international authority. In particular, the 1,000 and more inspections carried out under the terms of the CFE Treaty contributed considerably to transparency among the parties to the Treaty. But the CFE cannot directly translate into a conventional forces in Latin America treaty. Given the multipolar environment of Latin America, and the potential military dominance of the United States, special attention must be given to various confidence-building measures before any agreement could be reached on force levels. Other differences between the two include the relationship with the United States and the problems of counter-insurgency.

Confidence-building measures

Before any arms treaty can be accepted, possible concerns of both military and civilian leaders must be overcome. One useful confidence-building measure would be the diplomatic resolution of the many border disputes still open in Latin America. As Pastor has suggested, if these issues could be submitted to arbitration, perhaps through the OAS, the persuasiveness of geopolitical arguments put forth by the military would be reduced. It might make the most sense for all disputes to be submitted simultaneously, so that the panel could at least consider the effects of multiple rulings against or in favour of a particular country.

The military leaders of each country would need to learn to trust each other, much as those of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the former Warsaw Pact did. The November 1995 Conference on Security and Confidence-building Measures in Santiago was an excellent step in this direction. Plans were developed to share information on exercises, budgets, and force composition.[12] Another step

would be to increase the use of military exchange programmes. The presence of foreign officers in military academies and programmes of professional military education would significantly reduce the mistrust that comes from the unknown. Some limited joint exercises have already occurred.[13] Brazil schedules exchange visits by officers of several countries at the same time in order to increase the amount of communication between the various militaries. In July 1994, for example, officers from Argentina, Chile, Portugal, the United States and Uruguay were all visiting Brazilian military institutions.

Finally, the United States would need to earn the trust of the Latin American countries. One part of this could be to take the steps mentioned in the previous paragraph—there already are some Latin American cadets attending United States military academies. Confidence will be much harder to build in this case, however, because of United States history in the region.

Since United States forces would remain dominant in the hemisphere, it is especially important that the United States take measures to build the confidence of the Latin American States. Withdrawal of forces stationed in Latin America would contribute to this effort. Panama will remain a symbol of United States power and hegemony as long as United States forces are there. The base at Guantanamo Bay could legitimately remain as long as Cuba refuses to participate. If they did participate, the base would be less necessary. Puerto Rico presents the greatest problem, since it is an American territory. The only combat forces permanently stationed at the Naval Base at Roosevelt Roads, however, are some "adversary" A-4s attached to the composite squadron. While the rest of the support forces at the base could remain, relocating these aircraft to Key West would show United States good intentions.

The United States now seems less prone to unilateral action in Latin America (the Haitian operation is sufficiently multilateral). More emphasis is being placed on economic matters than military, which may lead to a more cooperative relationship. The success of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and its proposed extension into South America (as announced at the Summit of the Americas in December 1994), can implant habits of equal cooperation with Latin America that have been lacking previously. Even under future administrations, the end of communism and the apparent failures of the supply-side drug war will make the United States less of an agenda-setter. To the extent that the United States no longer dominates the OAS, there is a vacuum for non-American leadership to step forward, which will in turn lead to further equalization of relations.

Economic impact

A sweeping agreement such as a CFLA could have a significant impact on the economies of the countries affected. While conventional wisdom would say that reducing military expenditures is good, all things being equal, reductions in arms production could harm parts of the economy. Outside Latin America, there would be minimal effect: as already noted, the region only accounted for 5.6 per cent of world arms imports. Within Latin America, Looney concludes that defence expenditures do help a few countries, including Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela.[14] This is a surprising list, considering that Mexico and Venezuela have negligible arms industries. While their expenditures may not hurt their economy, one must doubt that the help is significant. In any case, Argentina is dismantling its military production capabilities. As for Brazil, in 1991, when we estimated its defence production at $169 million, the CIA *World Factbook* estimated its GDP at $358 billion. Thus defence production directly accounted for less than 0.05 per cent of Brazilian GDP. Even allowing for a generous multiplier effect, and

assuming that the capital now expended on armaments would not be invested profitably elsewhere, this proposal will not greatly affect the Brazilian economy: especially since they could still produce for export and produce domestically within the treaty limits.

International oversight

An arms control regime would require supervision by a regional organization, either the OAS, or a subsidiary agency like the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (which administers the Treaty of Tlatelolco). The OAS would act as a clearing-house for inspections, receipt of signatory information, and enforcement.

Enforcement of any agreement would seem to be a problem, because the OAS has historically been reluctant to intervene in the affairs of other States. In 1959, however, the Inter-American Juridical Committee established a distinction between illegitimate intervention and legitimate collective action. This finding contrasts the rights of the State with the rights of an international association of which it freely became a member. It concludes that legitimate "collective action seeks to redress the injury inflicted *on a whole international organization* ... in connection with the association itself *on account of the nonfulfillment of solemn multilateral commitments* ..." [emphasis added][15] This would seem to indicate that sanctions against the violator of a mutually-accepted treaty would not be illegal intervention.

The other role for the OAS would be to help promote democracy. A CFLA would only last as long as the signatories continued to accept it; it appears that a military regime would be more likely to repudiate the agreement than would a civilian regime. We are not trying to promote a "democracy equals peace" theory, but simply observing that the Latin American militaries continue to think in terms of geopolitics and armed solutions. Democratic leaders are less likely to

want a military build-up. The OAS, encouraged by these elected leaders, can act to maintain and reinforce democracy in the region.

The United Nations provides the framework for a weapons registry through the Register of Conventional Arms. Given the participation of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru in the Register, it appears that Latin America may be an appropriate region for an enhanced regional registry. The reciprocal nature of the Register may also make it slightly harder to covertly supply arms to Latin American States.

Technical issues

Once the concerns of military and civilian leaders have been eased, and the experience of cooperation has reduced the distrust between different countries, the arms control effort could turn to the technical issue of establishing force levels. Forces of the United States cannot be reasonably expected to be in "balance" with those of Latin American States. The vast majority of American forces are dedicated to the security of Western Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East. Those commitments will have to be honoured with or without a CFLA. Not only is the percentage of American forces "exempted" from CFLA greater than that in a CFE; the imbalance between the United States and Latin America is much higher than that between the United States and Western Europe, and the oceanic "buffer zone" between the United States and Latin America is much smaller than that between the United States and Europe. Since United States inventories would be essentially exempted *in toto* from the treaty, the confidence-building measures discussed above would be essential to the completion of any treaty.

Insurgencies in Latin America, especially in Peru, but also in Colombia, Guatemala, and now Mexico, are likely to remain a problem. The weapons systems most useful to counter-insurgency operations, such as attack helicopters, some aircraft, and perhaps small armoured fighting vehicles,

would need to be retained in higher numbers in those countries than elsewhere. The basing "zones" used in CFE would create "safe havens" for rebels if implemented in the same way. The Latin American militaries also have an internal security role less present in Europe.

Finally, the insurgents themselves present a challenge. Obviously, they could not be expected to sign a multilateral agreement and submit to inspections while fighting a war (nor would the Government in power give them such recognition). For the most part, however, they possess lighter weapons than this treaty or any treaty can hope to accurately cover. The greatest concern would be the disposition of any surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that insurgent groups—or conceivably, the cocaine cartels—might have. The Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) SAMs from El Salvador were at least in part stored in Nicaragua and revealed in a May 1993 explosion; perhaps there now are fewer unaccounted for than previously thought.

Force levels

We are not so bold as to propose specific force compositions in this paper. Any numbers that the leaders of Latin American States find mutually acceptable would accomplish the goals of stabilizing arms levels in the region and providing an example for other regions. We will suggest, however, that a framework of relative military balance be devised. These levels should maintain a balance within rivalries as much as possible.

Inspections

Inspections would be conducted as under the CFE. They would be on-site and mutual, although with some annual limits to prevent unwarranted intrusions on State sovereignty. On the basis of non-interference, inspections could be conducted in the presence of officials of the organization administering the treaty. While satellite coverage is not now as

extensive over Latin America as in Europe, the United States could, as another confidence-building measure, offer to provide more frequent space-based surveillance coverage to the Latin American signatories.

Incentives for participation in a future CFLA

Why would the leaders of Latin American countries be interested in negotiating this treaty? They have expressed such an interest through the Organization of American States, most recently in the 1991 Santiago Commitment to Democracy and Renewal of the International System:

> "Cooperation to guarantee the peace and security of the hemisphere is one of the essential purposes consecrated in the Charter of the OAS, and the proliferation of arms adversely affects international security and takes resources away from the economic and social development of the peoples of the member States;
>
> "[We declare our] decision to initiate a process of consultation on hemispheric security in light of the new conditions in the region and the world, from an updated and comprehensive perspective of security and disarmament, including the subject of all forms of proliferation of weapons and instruments of mass destruction."

Similar statements have been made before, however. The most noteworthy was the 1974 Ayacucho agreement, which called for limiting defence expenditures and prohibiting certain weapons. Its terms were never implemented; this may be due to the relative autonomy exercised by the Latin American militaries at that time.[16] Other than completing ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, little perceptible movement has occurred on arms control.

Nevertheless, there are two reasons to be optimistic that this proposal would be well-received. One of these is captured explicitly in the Santiago Declaration: military expenditures do not contribute to economic and social development, in the opinion of these leaders. Such development is important to the future of Latin America, and of the democratic leaders in particular. Absent a formal agreement, however, the logic of the security dilemma requires each country to match perceived advantages of its perceived rivals. This siphons resources away from other concerns. By breaking the shackles of neorealist uncertainty through openness and cooperation, growth and cooperation will both be facilitated.

The other reason for optimism is the relative political weakness of the military in Latin America since the latest transition to democracy. Unlike the period of the earlier proposals, such as Ayacucho and some follow-up efforts in the 1970s, the military does not rule. It may not even be able to veto the agreement. Given the history of Latin American politics, however, the military remains a potential rival for power against the democrats. A multilateral treaty aimed at reducing uncertainty and suspicion among the States of the region would undercut the geopolitical rationale for a stronger military. Economic development, strengthened by lower military expenditures, would reduce the likelihood of civil unrest (although 1994 events in Chiapas, Mexico underscore the importance of distributing the gains of development). O'Donnell and Schmitter have argued, in part, that the military will stay out of politics only if they receive a credible, honourable role.[17] Regional arms control offers a way to maintain military salaries and benefits, while cutting overall expenditures. Regional manoeuvres and expenditures, with the prospects for multilateral peace-keeping readiness, fit with the role now accepted by the professional militaries of the northern hemisphere. Both Uruguay and Argentina now participate extensively in United Nations peace-keeping

operations. Thus this proposal serves not only the interests of the States, but also the particular interests of the leaders currently in power.

Conclusion

Successful conventional arms control in Latin America would reduce both the likelihood and severity of war in the region by providing a way to escape the security dilemma. If each country purchases or deploys weapons only within mutually accepted limits, there would be less reason for military leaders to become alarmed by their neighbours' activities. A CFLA treaty would also help the economic growth of the region by allowing funds now spent on military hardware to go towards economic investment. If this growth is broad-based, this strategy might relieve some of the internal security problems as well. Thus both aspects of national security would be enhanced by agreeing to control conventional weaponry.

We believe that a CFLA treaty, along the lines described in this article, could be negotiated in the upcoming years. The process of negotiation on more equal terms might itself enhance hemispheric solidarity and stability. Furthermore, a successful CFLA treaty could serve as a model for multilateral arms control that could be extended to Africa and more war-prone regions of the world, such as the Middle East and East Asia.

Notes

The authors supplied extensive bibliographical references, only some of which were able to be included in this issue because of space limitations.

1 Jerry L. Weaver, "Arms transfers to Latin America: a note on the contagion effect", *Journal of Peace Research,* vol. 11, No. 3 (1974), pp. 213–219.

2 The recent war between Peru and Ecuador provides an example. While arms imbalances probably played only a small role (if any) in this war, the underlying insecurity present in an unregulated arms environment helps to aggravate the tension between these countries. For analysis of disputes, see Jack Child, *Geopolitics and Conflict in South America: Quarrels Among Neighbors* (New York: Praeger, 1985).

3 Abraham F. Lowenthal, *Partners in Conflict: The United States and Latin America* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), p. 37.

4 U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, "United States submits its contribution to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms", *Fact Sheet* (Washington, DC.: USACDA Office of Public Affairs, 15 July 1993).

5 "US aircraft for Argentina and Chile?" *Latin American Regional Report: Southern Cone,* (28 May 1994), p. 8.

6 *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1990* (Washington, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency), p. 133.

7 Michael Brzoska and Thomas Olson, eds., *Arms Production in the Third World* (London: Taylor & Francis, 1986), pp. 96–99.

8 Trevor N Dupuy, ed. *International Military and Defense Encyclopedia* (Washington: Brassey's, 1993). p. 185.

9 Robert A. Pastor, *Whirlpool: U.S. Foreign Policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 280–281.

10 It is not our intention to simply shift arms control problems to other parts of the globe. This issue would have to be taken up in the global context.

11 Michael A. Morris and Martin Slann, "Proliferation of weaponry and technology", in *Controlling Latin American Conflicts: Ten Approaches,* Michael A. Morris and Victor Millán, eds.(Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), pp. 117–127, suggest combining expenditure limits ("recipi-

ent restraints") with supplier restraints. They are not optimistic about its prospects, however.

12 Reuters, 9 November 1995.

13 Victor Millán, "Regional confidence-building in the military field: the case of Latin America", in *Controlling Latin American Conflicts: Ten Approaches,* Morris and Millán, eds. pp. 89–97.

14 Robert E. Looney, *Third World Military Expenditure and Arms Production* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988), pp. 207–212.

15 Inter-American Juridical Committee, Differences Between Intervention and Collective Action (Washington: OAS, 1959), pp. 13–14.

16 Augusto Varas, "Controlling conflict in South America: National approaches", in *Controlling Latin American Conflicts: Ten Approaches,* Morris and Millán, eds., pp. 71–85.

17 Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 35–36.